Evidence from Union Army Veterans * This study uses changes in pension laws for Union Army veterans as a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of pensions on longevity, and to examine potential pathways underlying such a relationship. We examine the effects of the pension laws of 1907 and 1912, which granted old-age pensions to Union Army veterans. Life expectancy for veterans, who received such a pension, increased by 0.5 years and 2.7 years, respectively. The effect of veteran pensions on longevity was large across wealth groups and size of city. Pensions reduced mortality for both acute and non-acute causes of death.
Introduction
Individuals with higher incomes tend to live longer (see surveys by Goldman 2001, Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006) . This relationship is well documented not only for individuals with different incomes in the same country (Rogot, Sorlie, Johannson, and Schmitt 1992, Gaudecker and Scholz 2006) , but it is also evident for average life expectancy across countries (Pritchett and Summers 1996) and across different time periods (Fogel 2004) . However, the relationship between income and longevity is complex and multi-facetted. Not only is it possible that higher income extends life, but it is also possible that better health increases income (Smith 1999 , Stewart 2001 ).
This study uses the passing of pension laws for Union Army veterans in the early 20 th century as a natural experiment to examine the causal effect of pensions on longevity. Veteran pensions constituted the first large-scale old-age pension system in the United States. For some periods, pensions for Union Army veterans amounted to more than 40% of federal expenditures and covered more than 900,000 beneficiaries (Sanders 2000) . We use longitudinal data from military and pension records which were collected from records housed in the national archives (ICSPR Series 6837), and information from the U.S. Federal Census in 1900 (ICSPR Series 6836). We examine the effects of the pension laws of 1907 and 1912, which granted pensions to all Union Army veterans, who had served in the army for a minimum of 90 days and were age 62+. The effect of pensions on longevity are examined separately by wealth levels, and for urban vs. rural populations, and we also investigate the effect of pensions on different causes of death.
This approach allows us to explore not only the direction of causality for a possible effect 3 from income to longevity, but also to examine the size of the effect, and learn more about the relevance and relative importance of different pathways in the health-income relationship.
Several potential pathways for a causal effect from income to health have been debated in the previous literature. McKeown (1976) and Fogel (2004) argue that much of the increase in life expectancy during the past two centuries is caused by improved nutrition. Pensions might have enabled Union Army veterans to buy more and higher quality food, which made them more resistant against infectious diseases.
Malnourishment is a rare problem in developed countries today, but poor nutrition is still a concern in many developing countries (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006) .
Another explanation for health differentials focuses on the psychosocial stress, which comes from low socioeconimic status and lack of control over one's life (Brunner and Marmot 1999) . Such stress may cause biological reactions that increase the risk of chronic diseases, especially cardiovascular diseases. This theory is supported by evidence from British Civil Servants, for whom there is a strong association between health and rank in the British Civil Service (Marmot et al. 1991) , and from other primates such as baboons, for whom there exists a relationship between low rank in the baboon hierarchy and increased risk of cardiovascular disease (Sapolsky 1993 (Sapolsky , 1998 . A third possible explanations for a causal effect from pensions on longevity focuses on health behaviors. Philipson and Becker (1998) argue that annuities such as lifelong veteran pensions provide incentives for beneficiaries to invest in their health and live longer. A fourth possible explanation for a causal effect of pensions on longevity centers on labor supply.
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Beneficiaries of a pension can afford to work less, which might improve their health (Ruhm 2000 ).
An important question, which has not been conclusively answered in the previous literature, is how redistributive government policies such as disability pensions or old-age pensions affect the health and longevity of beneficiaries. Previous studies on the effect of pensions on mortality arrive at opposite conclusions. Snyder and Evans (2006) use the Social Security notch in the 1970s as a source of exogenous income variation, and they find that lower pensions actually decrease mortality. Given the positive correlation between health and income, this finding is somewhat surprising. In contrast, in a study based on Union Army veterans, Logue and Blanck (2004) find that mortality rates were lower for veterans who received higher pensions. However, their estimation is based on time-invariant variables for the average pension amount, which each veteran received in the period between 1874 and 1890, and in the period between 1891 and 1907. Since pensions became more generous over time, average pensions are likely to be higher for veterans who survived longer. Also, during their study period the amount of pension depended on the degree of disability and was therefore not exogenous to health and mortality. To circumvent such endogeneity issues, our study examines the effect of oldage pensions, which did not depend on health.
Using Weibull hazard regression models, we find a large causal effect from veteran pensions on longevity. Life expectancy increases by about 0.5 years and 2.7 years for veterans who receive a law of 1907 pension and a law of 1912 pension, respectively.
We find evidence for large causal effects across wealth groups and for both urban and rural populations, but the effects are largest for poorer veterans and veterans who live 5 outside big cities. Pensions also reduce mortality from both acute and non-acute causes.
This study continues as follows. Section 2 describes the Union Army pension laws.
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 specifies the empirical model. Hazard regression results are presented in section 5. Results for the effect of pensions on life expectancy are explained in section 6. Section 7 shows estimation result for the effect of pensions on various causes of death, and section 8 concludes.
Union Army pension laws
The Union army pension program started with the General Law of July 14, 1862, which granted pensions to volunteer soldiers with war-related disabilities. The size of the pension depended on the severity of the disability. Subsequently, both the amount of pensions and the number of eligible veterans were increased in several stages (see overview in Table 1 ). 1 The Disability Act of June 27, 1890 introduced a new pension rating system that co-existed with provisions of the General Law. The Disability Act granted pensions to disabled Union Army veterans who had served for a minimum of 90 days and were unable to earn support by manual labor. Monthly pensions ranged from $6 to $12, depending on the degree of disability. Disability Act pensions were typically smaller than General Law pensions, which ranged to $125 monthly, but eligibility requirements were much less stringent, since disabilities no longer needed to be warrelated. 1900s--41% in 1893 1900s--41% in and 24% in 1909 1900s--41% in (Sanders 2000 . One explanation for these large allocations on behalf of Union Army veterans was the political power of the Great Army of the Republic, a veterans´ organization, which yielded an influence that was disproportionate to the number of Union Army veterans in the population (Holcombe 1999 , Linares 2001 (Costa 1998) . Of the veterans without pension files, many were ineligible for a pension, i.e. because of desertion, or they died before 1890, when the veteran pension system was still very restrictive (Fogel 1993 (Table 2 ). Take up rates are defined as the share of veterans in the sample who survive beyond 1907 or 1912, respectively, and who at some point of time receive a pension based on the relevant law. One potential concern is that take-up could be related to veterans' health. It is possible that some veterans were too sick to undertake the hassle of applying for a pension. But it is also possible that our reported take up rates are too low, because some pension records were lost or misplaced, or because some veterans in our sample were in fact not eligible for a pension, i.e.
because they served for less than 90 days 3 . As a plausibility test, in analysis not shown we regressed a binary take-up variable on the observed characteristics listed in table 3.
For the law of 1907, pension take-up was more likely for veterans who were farmers or service workers, and less likely for veterans who lived in cities with a population > 250,000. For the law of 1912, all explanatory variables were jointly insignificant in explaining pension take up. 5.8% of veterans, who survived beyond 1907, were rejected with at least one application for a law of 1907 pension ( Table 2 ). The equivalent rejection rate for law of 1912 pensions was 3.4%. However, most applicants finally received a pension. Only 0.6% of veterans, who survived beyond 1907, applied for a law of 1907 pension at least once and never received such a pension. For law of 1912 pensions, the equivalent share was 0.4%.
We also control for individual veteran attributes that plausibly affect longevity, specified as a set of time-invariant binary variables based on 1900 Census data: literacy (literate versus illiterate); marital status (married versus not married), occupation (classification following Wilcox (1992) , with professional or proprietor as omitted category), home ownership (homeowner versus renter), and city size (using most 158 populated cities in 1909-top 19 (>250,000 population), next 139 cities (26, (235) (236) (237) (238) (239) (240) (241) (242) (243) (244) (245) (246) (247) (248) (249) (250) 000 population), omitted category (population <26,235) (U. S. Census Bureau 1909). We use literacy as an approximation of education and homeownership as an approximation of wealth. Census records were linked to veterans' pension files based on name and place of residence (Fogel 1993) . However, pension records were not available or not complete for all veterans. The share of missing observations ranged from 19.5% for marital status to 65.8% for place of residence. In order to account for missing observations, we create binary variables for missing information on literacy, marital status, occupation, homeownership, and population of place of residence.
The mean age in 1900 in our baseline estimation sample was 60.7 years (Table 3 ). The mean age at death was 75.9 years. Of those veterans with non-missing observations, 93.8%
were literate and 81.7% were married. Most common occupation groups were farmers (34.9%), and artisans (15.1%). 67.6% were homeowners, 14% lived in cities with more than 250,000 populations and an additional 10.5% lived in the next 139 most populated cities.
Empirical Specification
We estimate a mortality hazard model, assuming a Weibull distribution and allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. 4 The mortality hazard is the risk of dying during the next period conditional on surviving until the end of the previous period. This represents for 11 example the risk of a 65 year old veteran of dying during the next year. The mortality hazard function for individual i at time t is:
where λ 0 (t) = α* t α-1 is the baseline hazard for the Weibull distribution with the shape parameter α, and exp(law1907 it β + law1912 it γ + X pension. The reduction in mortality after 1907, which is represented by arrow a in Figure   1 , is attributed to law of 1907 pensions, and the further decrease in mortality risk after 1912, which is illustrated by arrow b, is attributed to law of 1912 pensions. One concern is that lower mortality in later years could be explained not by the effect of a pension, but by a time trend of increasing longevity. During our study period, there was no time trend in life expectancy at age 65 for males in the U.S. population overall ( (Campbell 2004) 7 , and the Union Army veterans in our dataset are broadly representative for the general northern white population in terms of wealth before the war, and in terms of mortality around 1900 (Costa 1998 (Costa , 2003 . By eliminating General Law pensioners who received pensions because of war related disabilities, which
were not common in the general population, our sample should arguably be even more representative of the overall white northern U.S. population. Therefore, any substantial reduction in mortality for veterans who received a law of 1907 or a law of 1912 pension can not be attributed to a time trend of rising longevity.
We compute estimates of the effect of pensions on life expectancy at age 65.
Using results from our hazard estimation we compute predicted annual mortality rates for every veteran in our sample and for each year of age from age 65 to 99 under the counterfactual assumption that the pension laws of 1907 and 1912 were never enacted.
We use these mortality rates to predict the life expectancy at age 65 for every veteran in the sample. Next, we compute an alternative set of predicted mortality rates under the equally counterfactual assumption that all veterans always received a law of 1907 pension. Based on the alternative mortality rates we predict life expectancy at age 65 for every veteran in the sample. -20.pdf, accessed Feb. 8, 2007) . 7 Since veterans comprised a significant share of the elderly male population, the effects of veteran pensions on life expectancy might show in population life expectancy. This could mean that in the absence of veteran pensions population life expectancy at age 65 might have declined.
Hazard regression results
Hazard regression results are shown in Table 5 . Column 1 shows the baseline specification, which includes the full estimation sample. Coefficients show hazard ratios.
A hazard ratio of one indicates that a variable has no effect on mortality. A hazard ratio of less than one indicates that a variable is associated with lower mortality. Estimated hazard ratios are 0.918 for veterans receiving a law of 1907 pension and 0.665 for veterans receiving a law of 1912 pension. These hazard ratios are significantly lower than one at the five percent level and one percent level, respectively. These findings indicate that there is a causal effect from receiving a pension to lower mortality. We find no significant effects of literacy, marital status, and occupation on mortality hazards.
Mortality hazards for homeowners are significantly lower than for renters (hazard ratio = 0.816), and mortality for veterans who lived in cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants is significantly higher than mortality for veterans in small towns or country (hazard ratio = 1.227). Baseline mortality increases with age, as is indicated by the shape parameter of 8.22. In this specification as well as in all other specifications presented in this study, we find no evidence for unobserved heterogeneity; the estimated variance of the gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity term is not significantly different from zero.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show estimates of the effect of pensions on mortality separately for the subgroup of homeowners and renters. We interpret homeownership as an approximation of wealth, assuming that homeowners were on average wealthier than 
Life expectancy
Based on estimated mortality hazards, we calculate life expectancies at age 65, using the method described above. 8 Table 5 shows mean predicted life expectancies of veterans in the sample. Standard errors of mean life expectancies are calculated from 200 bootstrap repetitions. Mean predicted life expectancy at age 65 for the full sample is 11.13 years, which is close to the population mean life expectancy for men at age 65 of 11.35 years in 1900 and 11.01 years in 1907 (see Table 4 
Cause of death
As discussed in the introduction there are a number of potential pathways which could explain a large causal effect from pensions to longevity. Some of the pathways, This information can be used to draw inferences about the relevance of potential pathways. For example, better nourished people are less likely to succumb to infectious diseases. They resist most bacterial (though not viral) diseases better, and recover more rapidly and more often (McKeown 1976 , Fogel 2004 . Outside of economics the currently dominant theory is that poor health of low-income people is caused by psychosocial stress-the consequences of having low socioeconomic status and little control over one's life. This psychosocial stress causes biochemical reactions that lead to increased probabilities of chronic diseases, especially cardiovascular diseases (Brunner and Marmot 1999 , Sapolsky 1993 . Veteran pensions might have increased the social status of veterans in two ways. First, pensions provided higher income. Second, they also provided recognition of past patriotic service. Another possible pathway is that pensions allowed veterans to retire from work. Snyder and Evans (2006) argue that working at older ages actually decreases mortality, but working conditions were more dangerous in the past than they are today (Costa and Kahn 2004) . Retirement from work could lead to a lower probability of fatal accidents, but also to a reduction in chronic diseases.
The data provide information on the cause of death for 47.8% of the veterans in the baseline sample in Table 5 , Column 1. Veterans for whom cause of death is available tended to be those with remaining dependents who could claim widow or orphan pensions. Information about cause of death comes mostly from death certificates that were sent to the pension office by relatives of deceased veterans. Information about cause of death in our data is very detailed and includes categories such as such as "struck by train (accidental)" and "struck by train (suicide)". Causes of death are grouped into eight categories, which follow broad ICD 9-CM code classes (Table 7) . For the veterans in our sample with known death cause, the shares of causes of death by category are: infectious and parasitic diseases (6.9 %), diseases of the respiratory system (9.9%) , diarrhea (0.5 %), diseases of the circulatory system (29.2 %), cancer and neoplasms (5.5%), diseases of the genitourinary system (7.9 %), diseases of the digestive system (4.4%), accidents and violence (3.7%), and other (31.5 %) 9 . The total share of acute diseases is 17.4%
(infectious and parasitic diseases, diseases of the respiratory system, diarrhea), and the share of non-acute diseases is 78.9% (diseases of the circulatory system, cancer and neoplasms, diseases of the genitourinary system, diseases of the digestive system, and other diseases). The frequency of death causes during our study period was different from today (Costa 2003, Cutler, Deaton, and Muney-Lleras 2006) . Some of the most common causes of death a century ago are rare in developed countries today (e.g. death due to some infectious diseases such as tuberculosis or respiratory infections), while other causes of death are more common today (e.g., lung cancer). Overall, the share of people dying from infectious diseases has declined, while the share of people dying from chronic diseases, especially ischemic heart diseases and cancer, has increased (Costa 2003) . The distribution of death causes in our data is more similar to developing countries than to developed countries today. In developing countries infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and respiratory infections are still a frequent cause of death (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006) .
We estimate separate mortality hazard models for different causes of death.
Causes of death we examine are broad categories for all acute diseases, and for all nonacute diseases. We also estimate hazards for infectious and parasitic diseases only and diseases of the circulatory system 10 . We restrict the estimation sample to veterans with known cause of death. Estimation results are shown in Table 8 . Homeowners face a lower risk of dying from acute diseases (hazard ratio = 0.831) and married veterans are more likely to die from non-acute diseases (hazard ratio = 1.737).
Column 4 shows estimation results for the risk of dying from diseases of the circulatory system. Veterans who receive a law of 1907 pension are less likely to die from circulatory diseases (hazard ratio = 0.892), but the effect is not statistically significant.
The hazard ratio for veterans with a law of 1912 pension is 0.769 which is significantly lower than one at the 10 percent level. The risk of dying from circulatory diseases is also lower for homeowners (hazard ratio = 0.735), and it is higher for married veterans (hazard ratio = 1.444).
In summary, we find that veteran pensions decrease mortality for a broad range of causes. These findings indicate that multiple pathways might play a role in explaining the effect of higher pensions on lower mortality. Our finding that pensions strongly reduce mortality from acute causes, especially from infectious diseases, is consistent with the hypothesis, advocated for example by McKeown (1976) and Fogel (2004) , that better nutrition played an important role in historic mortality declines. However, we find that pensions also reduced mortality from circulatory diseases and other non-acute conditions.
Possible explanations for lower mortality from circulatory diseases and other chronic conditions include improved socioeconomic status, changes in health behaviors or retirement from hazardous work conditions.
Conclusions
Changes in veteran pension laws provide us with a series of natural experiments, which allow estimating the causal effect of pensions on longevity. We study mortality patterns for Union Army veterans during the period from 1900 and 1917, and we examine the effects of the pension laws of 1907 and 1912, which introduced or substantially increased veteran pensions. Starting from 1907, every Union Army veteran with at least 90 days of service was entitled to a pension at age 62+. Using a Weibull hazard model, we find that veteran pensions decrease mortality considerably. Lifeexpectancy increases by about 0.5 years and 2.7 years for veterans who receive a law of 1907 pension and a law of 1912 pension, respectively. During our study period there was no increase in life expectancy for the overall elderly male population so that these effects can not be attributed to a time trend of increasing life expectancy. We find evidence for large causal effects from pensions to longevity across wealth groups and for both urban and rural populations, but the effects are largest for poorer veterans and for veterans who live outside big cities. Studying the effect of pensions on various causes of death allow us to draw inferences about the relative importance of alternative pathways in the incomehealth relationship. Pensions reduced mortality for both acute and non-acute diseases, indicating that multiple pathways might be important. Pensions had the biggest effect on lower mortality from infectious diseases. This finding is consistent with the explanation that better nutrition was an important pathway for an effect from veteran pensions on health. But pensions also reduced mortality from circulatory diseases and other non-acute conditions. These findings could be explained by the effect of improved socioeconomic status, changes in health behaviors, or retirement from dangerous working conditions.
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The main policy conclusion of our findings is that government transfers such as veteran pensions can not only improve the quality of life for beneficiaries, but can also substantially extend their length of life. The effects of veteran pensions on life expectancy were equivalent to the effect of many decades worth of medical progress and economic growth. This relationship was already suspected by contemporaries. In 1889, General M. Trumball speculated that "nothing increases longevity like a pension" (Logue and Blanck 2004) . One important question is whether conditions during our study period can in any way be compared with contemporary conditions. In many ways, health conditions in early 20 th century America were more similar to developing countries today than to developed countries. For example, factors such as poor nutrition, mortality from infectious diseases, and hazardous working and living conditions were common in the United States during our study period. Such factors are less important in the United States today, but they are still an urgent concern in many developing countries. However, health inequalities have not become smaller since the days of Union Army veterans (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006) , and the health-income gradient is not confined to the desperately poor and undernourished (Marmot et al. 1991) . Other pathways from higher income to lower mortality, such as reduced psychosocial stress, are still likely to be relevant in contemporary rich countries.
Many important questions about the effect of pensions and other government transfers on the health of beneficiaries are still unresolved. One interesting question this study does not address is the relationship between the amount of pension and mortality. (Lebergott 1984) 2) Veterans who received general law pensions are not included in estimation sample Infectious and parasitic diseases 6.9
Diseases of the respiratory system 9.9 Diarrhea 0.5
Not acute 78.9
Diseases of the circulatory system 29.2
Cancer and Neoplasm 5.5
Diseases of the genitourinary system 7.9
Diseases of the digestive system 4.4 Other * 31.5
Violence and accidents 3.7 *Other causes included endocrine diseases, diseases of the blood and blood forming organs, diseases of the nervous system, diseases of the skin, diseases of the musculoskeletal system, and symptoms, signs, and ill defined conditions. (or 1912, respectively ) is a time varying variable. All other covariates are fixed over time and refer to information in the year 1900. Estimation coefficients reflect hazard ratios; Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
